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Bank Negara Malaysia and the Architecture of Malaysia’s Financial Statecraft

Victor Tan
 

Economics is not finance, finance is not economics. 

We know this to be true. 

Yet we see how they rhyme with one another in interesting, subtle and layered ways. 

In this piece, we will dive into the very first of our institution reports – an institution that is extremely important to Malaysia, both its present and its future. 

Let’s go!

The Architecture of Financial Statecraft: Bank Negara’s Holistic Role

Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) – Malaysia’s central bank – stands at the intersection of economics and finance, exercising a form of financial statecraft that has been instrumental in the nation’s development. 

Established on January 26, 1959, just over a year after independence, BNM was created to issue Malaysia’s currency and to safeguard monetary and financial stability.[1] 

Over the decades, its mandate has expanded into a comprehensive stewardship of the country’s financial system. Unlike a narrow focus on inflation or interest rates alone, Malaysia’s central bank operates with a broad toolkit that bridges macroeconomic policy and financial sector development.

At its core, BNM’s primary objectives are to promote monetary stability (keeping prices stable and inflation low) and financial stability (ensuring a safe, sound banking system), both of which are seen as prerequisites for sustainable economic growth.[2] But the “architecture” of Malaysia’s financial statecraft involves much more than setting the overnight policy interest rate. The central bank wears multiple hats in orchestrating the financial system:

  • Monetary Authority: BNM sets the nation’s key interest rate (the Overnight Policy Rate) to influence borrowing costs, credit expansion, and economic activity. Through open market operations and other tools, it manages liquidity and guides inflation expectations. For instance, since the adoption of an explicit policy rate framework in 2004, BNM has adjusted rates in response to economic conditions (e.g. cutting rates aggressively during the 2008–09 global financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic, then raising them as recovery took hold).[3] Its record of maintaining moderate inflation (typically in the low single digits) underscores a commitment to price stability on par with advanced peers.
  • Banker, Advisor, and Debt Manager to Government: By law, Bank Negara is the banker and financial adviser to the Malaysian government.[1] It manages the issuance of government securities and helps coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. When Malaysia funds development projects or runs deficits, BNM plays a crucial role in ensuring those financing needs are met in an orderly fashion. In practice, this means conducting auctions of Malaysian Government Securities, advising on debt strategies, and sometimes purchasing government bonds in secondary markets to ensure market stability (as it did briefly during periods of stress).
  • Regulator and Supervisor of the Financial System: BNM acts as the chief regulatory architect of Malaysia’s financial sector. It licenses and supervises commercial banks, Islamic banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions, enforcing prudential standards to maintain solvency and integrity. The bank is empowered by comprehensive legislation – such as the Financial Services Act 2013 and Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 – to set the rules of the game for finance.[4] This includes prescribing capital adequacy ratios for banks, curbing excessive risk-taking, and protecting consumers. For example, in the mid-2010s BNM imposed macroprudential limits (like a cap on loan-to-value ratios for multiple home mortgages) to rein in surging household debt and speculative property lending.[5] These measures, alongside responsible lending guidelines, reflect BNM’s proactive use of regulatory levers to preempt financial instability.
  • Guardian of the Payment System: In today’s economy, the plumbing of finance – payment networks, clearing and settlement systems – is critical. BNM oversees both traditional payment systems (like the Real-time Electronic Transfer of Funds and Securities, RENTAS) and fosters innovation in digital payments. It formulates regulatory frameworks and standards for electronic payments, ensuring they are efficient and secure.[6] Under BNM’s watch, Malaysia has developed one of Southeast Asia’s most advanced payment infrastructures, including a national QR code standard (DuitNow) that enables instant fund transfers and e-wallet interoperability. The central bank’s oversight gives the public and businesses confidence that they can transact smoothly, a linchpin for commerce.
  • Manager of the Nation’s Reserves and Currency Value: BNM manages Malaysia’s international reserves – which stood at about US$118 billion as of early 2025 – to ensure adequate buffers against external shocks and to support the value of the Malaysian ringgit.[7] Through interventions in the foreign exchange market, the central bank can smooth excessive volatility in the ringgit’s exchange rate. Notably, BNM has used both orthodox and unorthodox tactics in different eras to defend the currency. It maintains a managed float exchange rate regime today, where the ringgit’s value is market-determined but the bank may intervene during disruptive swings. This role has been crucial in maintaining investor confidence and external stability, especially for a trade-dependent nation like Malaysia.
  • Lender of Last Resort: A less visible but vital function, BNM serves as the lender of last resort to the banking system. In times of crisis or bank runs, it can extend emergency liquidity to banks to prevent a collapse of confidence. This backstop underpins public trust that their deposits are safe. For example, during the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis, BNM’s readiness to inject liquidity (and the establishment of blanket deposit guarantees in 1998) helped stabilize the system when panic could have taken hold.[8]

Together, these roles illustrate how Bank Negara acts not just as an economic policymaker but as the architect of Malaysia’s financial system, shaping the rules, norms, and structures within which financial activity unfolds. This is financial statecraft in action: using financial policy instruments strategically to achieve national objectives. Under BNM’s guidance, Malaysia’s financial landscape has grown from rudimentary beginnings to a diversified, modern system encompassing conventional and Islamic finance, large domestic banks with regional footprints, and vibrant capital markets. Crucially, the central bank’s approach has always been “holistic” – recognizing that interest rates, banking regulations, payment networks, and human capital development in finance are interconnected pieces of the puzzle. By aligning these elements, Bank Negara Malaysia has sought to harmonize the rhythms of economics and finance, as the opening lines allude, in the service of the nation’s progress.

An Institution at the Heart of Malaysia’s Development 

Beyond its statutory duties, Bank Negara has long seen itself as an instrument of national development. Malaysia’s post-colonial leaders understood that building a robust financial system was essential to economic growth and the wellbeing of its citizens. Thus, BNM’s mission has extended into nurturing the financial sector and talent pool in ways that few central banks globally attempt, blurring the line between financial policy and developmental economics.

One major area is talent development and knowledge-building. BNM not only employs and trains a large cadre of its own economists, bankers, and supervisors; it has also invested in educating the broader ecosystem of financial professionals and future leaders. The bank offers prestigious scholarships each year to high-achieving young Malaysians to pursue studies in economics, finance, and related fields at top universities, on the condition that they return and serve with the Bank or contribute to the nation.[9] This scholarship programme – dating back decades – has quietly shaped a generation of policy makers and financial industry leaders. Many of its scholars have gone on to influential roles within BNM and other key institutions, ensuring a continuous infusion of expertise into Malaysia’s financial governance.

Perhaps the most ambitious example of BNM’s commitment to human capital is the establishment of the Asia School of Business (ASB) in Kuala Lumpur. 

In 2015, under the leadership of Governor Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Bank Negara Malaysia partnered with the MIT Sloan School of Management to found ASB, a new world-class business school.[10] The Asia School of Business, which welcomed its first MBA students in 2016, combines MIT’s rigor with hands-on exposure to Asian markets. It was conceived as a response to the need for top-tier managerial talent in Malaysia and the region – effectively a “central bank’s business school” aimed at producing future CEOs, entrepreneurs, and policy shapers. Not only did BNM provide the initial endowment and campus (even locating it next to the central bank’s Sasana Kijang learning center), but Governor Zeti herself became co-chair of ASB’s board after retiring from the bank.[11] This unusual venture reflects BNM’s view that a sophisticated financial system ultimately depends on a pipeline of skilled, innovative people. ASB’s curriculum places heavy emphasis on action learning with companies in ASEAN, aligning with BNM’s vision to bridge academic theory and real-world practice in finance and business.[10]

BNM has also set up or supported a host of other institutions for capacity-building in finance. In 2003 it created the ICLIF Leadership and Governance Centre, dedicated to training corporate and public-sector leaders in good governance and strategic management. In 2006, it established the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF), now a university that develops specialists in Islamic banking and finance – an area where Malaysia has become a global leader (more on this shortly). These centers, alongside BNM’s own training academy and regular seminars, have turned Kuala Lumpur into something of an intellectual hub for central banking and finance in the region.

Another developmental thrust has been financial inclusion and literacy. Bank Negara has worked to broaden access to financial services for Malaysians from all walks of life, under the principle that an inclusive financial system supports socioeconomic development. In practice, this meant encouraging the expansion of bank branches and services beyond urban centers, and when brick-and-mortar banking reached its limits, enabling agent banking and digital finance solutions. By the 2010s, BNM introduced frameworks allowing banks to appoint local retail shops or post offices as agents to offer basic banking (deposits, withdrawals, bill payments) in rural areas. The results have been striking: Malaysia’s financial inclusion metrics – such as the percentage of adults with a bank account – are among the highest in emerging Asia (well over 90%).[12] Through initiatives like the National Strategy for Financial Literacy 2019-2023, co-led by BNM, the bank has also promoted public understanding of finance, from teaching schoolchildren the importance of saving to running a state-of-the-art Money Museum and Financial Gallery at its headquarters. All these efforts are part of crafting an ecosystem where ordinary citizens can participate in and benefit from the financial system safely.

Bank Negara’s developmental role also involves market development and innovation. The bank has been pivotal in building Malaysia’s domestic capital markets – for example, helping to launch the local bond market in the 1980s and 90s, and supporting the creation of institutions like the Securities Commission in 1993 to regulate those markets. In the 2000s, BNM championed Islamic finance as a dual system alongside conventional finance. It granted licenses to Islamic banks and takaful (Islamic insurance) operators, developed Shariah governance standards, and pushed for Islamic financial instruments. Thanks in large part to these policies, Malaysia today has the world’s largest sukuk (Islamic bond) market and a thriving Islamic banking sector capturing around 30% of total banking assets. This is a clear example of Bank Negara using financial statecraft to achieve a strategic national goal: positioning Malaysia as a global Islamic finance center, which diversifies the financial sector and reinforces the country’s Muslim-majority identity in the economic sphere.[13]

Crucially, BNM’s influence extends into the broader policy sphere. The central bank often works in concert with the government’s economic plans, while maintaining an arm’s-length independence in its core decisions. 

It has been said that Bank Negara provides the “long-term memory” in Malaysian economic management – its leaders, armed with data and analysis, have not shied from advising government leaders on what needs to be done for sustainable growth, even if politically difficult. For example, BNM has periodically sounded the alarm on issues like high household debt and housing affordability, prompting fiscal authorities to adjust policies (such as tightening mortgage lending rules or introducing housing schemes). 

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, BNM moved swiftly to mitigate economic damage by slashing interest rates to historic lows and coordinating an automatic six-month loan moratorium with the banking industry to give relief to borrowers.[14] While unorthodox, this massive moratorium (which was later extended in targeted ways) helped tide over households and small businesses, and was credited with preventing a sharper economic collapse. It exemplified how BNM’s actions intersected with social policy, as the bank recognized the extraordinary shock to livelihoods and crafted a financial solution to cushion it.

In sum, Bank Negara Malaysia is not a cloistered central bank concerned only with charts and rates; it is a central institution in Malaysia’s business, political, and social ecosystem. Its policies on banking and credit affect the day-to-day life of entrepreneurs trying to get loans, families buying homes, students seeking scholarships, and investors domestic or foreign. The bank’s leadership has often been drawn into national conversations on economic direction, from industrialization strategies in earlier decades to today’s debates on digital economy and climate change. And because of its reputation for professionalism, BNM has at times been one of the most trusted public institutions in Malaysia – perceived as relatively technocratic and insulated from politics, even as it works closely with politicians in formulating policy. This trust was hard-earned and has been tested occasionally (as we will see in historical episodes), but it remains a key asset: people generally believe that Bank Negara “has Malaysia’s back” when it comes to financial matters.

To appreciate how BNM came to assume such a multifaceted and respected role, one must look at the history and evolution of the institution. The bank’s character has been shaped by economic trials by fire – from the turbulent early years of nationhood, through boom and bust cycles, financial crises, and transformations in the global financial landscape. 

In the narrative that follows (available to our Premium members), we trace Bank Negara’s journey through time in a historical jaunt through time as we look through the history of the central bank throughout the eras., highlighting how each era and each Governor left a distinct imprint on Malaysia’s financial statecraft.

The History and Legacy of Bank Negara

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Dr. Goh Keng Swee: Architect of Singapore’s Economic Miracle

Victor Tan
 

Sepupus, most of you who are reading this are probably aware that I am from Malaysia, and a subset of you are probably aware about the traumatic separation between Malaysia and Singapore.

If you have known me over the years, you may also know how I have wrestled with this complexity both in my existence as a Malaysian and in my interactions with Singaporeans, and in my later reading, reflection, and heightened understanding of this event.

In time, and upon reflecting upon the ties of kinship, trauma, and renewed kinship between our two nations, I have come into the realization that Singapore’s story is a story of transformation, renewal, not just of surviving but also of thriving – It is a key case study that any student of economics must be aware of if they wish to understand the importance of institutions, policies, and economic planning for securing the future of a country.

Most of you who know me in person further likely understand very clearly that I am a strong admirer of the Singapore story – not just the story of the country itself as articulated by Lee Kuan Yew, but also his book “The Singapore Story” in itself, which I have read from cover to cover three times by now, even as I now read his “From Third World to First” for the third time for a project that is coming up for Singapore’s Diamond Jubilee, SG60.

But you probably also know that I like to read beneath the surface – At least, I like to tell myself that I read beneath the surface, and therefore, I cannot discuss Singapore’s success without highlighting the role of one of its chief architects: Dr. Goh Keng Swee.

With that in mind, I am very proud to share with you this premium report below, accessible in full by our premium members or purchasable for USD10 over here, about the man behind Lee Kuan Yew and a sine qua non of Singapore’s economic success.

Introduction

When Lee Kuan Yew delivered the eulogy for his old comrade Dr. Goh Keng Swee in 2010, he declared that “of all my Cabinet colleagues, it was Goh Keng Swee who made the greatest difference to the outcome for Singapore” (pmo.gov.sg). 

Dr Goh is clearly from Singapore, but the fact that he was one of the chief planners of a nation that so sharply diverged away from Malaysia and became one of the most prosperous countries in the world in per capita terms is something that should give not only Malaysia but the rest of the world pause, as they contemplate the consequences of a grand natural experiment illustrating the consequences of institutions and policy formulation upon the fate of two countries that share in ties of kinship, but prioritize dramatically different things. (More on this in subsequent reports and posts) 

Indeed, Dr. Goh was the quiet powerhouse behind many of Singapore’s early triumphs – the economic architect who engineered the nation’s leap from Third World to First, the strategist who built up a credible defence from scratch, and the reformer who overhauled Singapore’s education system. 

A man of incisive intellect and steely pragmatism, Goh served as Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s trusted lieutenant, often tasked with the toughest problems of government (pmo.gov.sg), combining scholarly rigor with an unflinching practicality to carry out the bold policies that laid the robust foundations of modern Singapore. 

This report explores how Dr. Goh Keng Swee set up Singapore’s economic base and key institutions, his interactions with Lee Kuan Yew (including Lee’s own influence and support), and the unique thinking and vision that Goh brought to the fledgling nation. It is a narrative of how one extraordinary man – perhaps one whom we could dub Lee Kuan Yew’s “hatchet man” for his role in executing difficult policies – systematically planned and built the structures that would support Singapore for generations to come. (Lee once said he intended to see that Singapore “will be here a thousand years from now. And that is your duty and mine” – a vision made attainable by the enduring institutions he and colleagues like Goh created(pmo.gov.sg).)

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Islamist Economic Governance: PAS, Global Islamist Parties, and the Case of Iran

Victor Tan
 

Hello and welcome back, sepupus! (Psst! Join our Telegram group!)

Politics is not conventionally considered a part of Economics, but in reality, the subjects are deeply intertwined; Economics is the art of allocating resources to best meet the unlimited wants of humans in the best possible ways, while politics in many ways decides what every society and economy deems best.

The relationship goes a little further than that, but the first ‘economists’ like Adam Smith, Ricardo, JS Mill, and Karl Marx were political economists – they wrote not only about how resources are allocated in society, but also institutions, laws, class relations, governance, and moral philosophy.

These aren’t topics I’ve written about just yet, but they are things I will touch on a little later.

Meanwhile, today, we will be talking about Islamist economic governance, focusing on PAS and later Iran. Exciting topic – normally, this would be a premium resource given the amount of research that has gone into it, but in this instance, your access will be free although you will have to register in order to read this piece in full.

Why?

Well, because today, I saw a strange recommendation from former Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department for Legal Affairs and Judicial Reform, Zaid Ibrahim.

This was what I first saw when MalaysiaKini reported the matter.

I could not believe what he had said, and there was a part of me that just immediately had something almost akin to an allergic reaction. Iran? Like, in the middle of a war and being threatened by Donald Trump Iran?

Before long, I had started writing, and the result is what you see today – Which begins by understanding what Zaid actually said.

Here is what Zaid said:

I find Zaid’s opinion interesting. I respect Zaid’s right to his opinion, but I do not share it for various reasons, including the fact that an ulama council would not be elected and would not be subject to democracy – not that PAS really respects democracy beyond a means to an end to confront the fact that their end goal is impossible under the conditions of the nation state, but certainly, we can see that they try.

In the very first place, it is unclear that PAS respects the constitution of Malaysia or our monarchy (Feat. A discussion between me and Dr. Azmil Tayeb), and it has been rebuked by the royals for that specific reason, preaching respect for royalty only when it is convenient for them.

I would also observe that PAS may have tried to offer a moral and political direction, but it appears that what we have is repeated instances of lawsuits because of slander, shaky assertions from leaders such as Siti Mastura and Razman Zakaria, what seems to be a culture of facilitating that slander and hate speech on the part of its leaders, heady declarations against non-Muslims asserting that they cannot and should not have political power and that no matter what, Malay Muslims must rule and other races are safe only IF that is the case, failure to address drug addiction, maintain water infrastructure, and so on and so forth while they maintain moral and religious policing while peddling hatred with no clear or apparent benefit, and preach morality while failing to maintain moral standards amongst the populace while insisting that it is only with their governance that they can ensure a moral population despite minimal evidence that they have succeeded in any meaningful way on that front unless morality is racial saber rattling, pretending to ‘protect’ people while trying to co-opt racial causes built on scaring their own race, including people who visited Christmas celebrations by choice, supporting individuals punished for the charge of slandering people and thereby jeopardising their right to religious freedom (See: Becoming Hannah), while pretending they are the representatives of the Malays, repeatedly lying about their political opponents, imagining that disasters involving foreign nationals are a ‘punishment from God’ with half-baked logic, and then reaping the rewards of their logic by praying for concerts to be canceled by rain only to receive floods in their states. This they do while stifling critical thinking across almost every dimension while preaching a constant narrative about their being oppressed or colonized in every way, while casually trying to establish dominance, betraying their political partners

Oh, how about the part where they even tried to conduct foreign interference into Singapore, peddling influence of a flavor that Ahmad Mattar from the PAP alleged was one of the PAP’s deep concerns (Page 254 – 255, The Singapore Dilemma by Lily Zubaidah Rahim – now selling for the pretty price of RM1179.20 on Shopee, and SGD81 on Kinokuniya Singapore – or it would be if it weren’t out of stock) and gaslighting Singaporean Malays, as part of tag teams with individuals of questionable repute such as Noor Deros?

Need I say more?

Let’s also observe that netizens too do not share his opinion, although note that this is merely one part of the echo chamber, and there are more echo chambers out there – do read widely to avoid that, and don’t take what I say as the truth without evaluation.

Also, opinions are not evidence or truth – but they do say something. Consider some of the truth conveyed by the comments below.

As for no financial scandals?

Maybe.

But then Clare Rewcastle-Brown might disagree on that point.

Well, Zaid is entitled to his opinion – but if you were to ask me?

It is my opinion that constitutionally, ethically, educationally, developmentally, institutionally, environmentally, socially, and culturally, PAS has failed.

In other words?

Well, Zaid said that PAS can “take Malaysia to heights we have yet to reach”.

That’s interesting.

Do we have proof that they have done so that somehow we have a confidence that they have the ability to govern the present as a rational basis for the future?

Do we have any proof that they can do that beyond their feeble statements in parliament, and their whataboutism involving DAP?

What’s the verdict?

It is not encouraging.

If it is true as Zaid says that PAS can “take Malaysia to heights we have yet to reach”, that does not really seem to be related to its religious agenda, and it would appear that it has to be tied directly to what is common to all of us after you cut away everything else.

This brings us now to our main topic.

That’s right, sepupus.

This is Sepupunomics, and it logically follows that we must talk about the economy.

PAS and the Economy

We discussed the numerous failures of PAS on multiple fronts earlier, all of which relate in nuanced ways to methods of capturing standards of living that stand beyond the usage of gross domestic product per capita – to demonstrate that PAS has failed on all of those fronts.

If PAS administration is good administration, then that logically must mean that it is able to push Malaysia forward to achieve goals such as standards of living improvements – Rather than just religious sabre-rattling and moral policing while hoping for sedekah or rezeki or for parties like DAP to do research through their think tanks on matters like the hydrogen transition, National Energy Transition Roadmap, National Semiconductor Strategy, or the New Industrial Master Plan 2030.

What do we mean?

If we are to say that PAS can in fact rule Malaysia, then they must be able to deal with the Malaysian economy and show proof that they can deal with the Malaysian economy.

Otherwise, it is meaningless to talk about the concept of ‘advancement’ in the first place.

Let’s understand what PAS is doing with what it has at the moment to try to understand whether it has what it takes to deal with the rest of the country and in turn deal with the rest of the world.

PAS‐Ruled States in Context

It would not be fair to declare that the present state of PAS-run states is purely the result of PAS administration, and we have to look at what all these governments were dealing with beforehand – a very important part of economic logic.

In economic terms, what happened on the margin?

In other words, what happened as a result of PAS administration that would not have as a result of PAS administration, to the extent that we know it?

In the best case scenario, we would be able to split up reality into two dimensions, and have PAS rule one set of states and another dimension where PAS did not rule those states, and then compare the economic differences.

Unfortunately, we only have one reality to look at, and we cannot completely know what an alternate history would look like where PAS ruled states were not ruled by PAS.

However, we can make comparisons across states in order to get ourselves an idea.

With that in mind, let’s first have a look at what PAS is dealing with and its timeline of control to understand what they have done with the economies of the states they have ruled.

Timeline of PAS Control

StatePAS First Took OfficePeriods of RuleQuick Context at Handover
KelantanOct 1990Continuous since 1990Already Malaysia’s poorest; GDP pc ≈ RM3–4 k in 1990 (≈15 % of national). Rural, rubber-rice economy and ageing infrastructure.
TerengganuNov 19991999-2004, then again since May 2018Inherited an oil-rich state (royalty > RM1 bn/yr) but BN had financed many prestige projects; PAS immediately lost royalty as Putrajaya converted it to wang ehsan cash grants
(thenutgraph.com)
.
KedahMar 20082008-2013 (Pakatan-PAS), lost, then since May 2020Took over a state with Kulim High-Tech Park (1990s BN legacy) and large paddy sector; manufacturing cluster linked to Penang supply chains.
PerlisNov 2022Since 2022Tiny, agrarian economy; PAS administration too recent for trend analysis.

1 What Has Happened to the Numbers under PAS?

Let’s compare the growth rates of PAS economies as compared to Malaysia as a whole as a baseline to understand what we are working with.

Key idea: Instead of looking only at today’s ringgit values, compare how fast each state’s GDP per capita (current prices) has grown since 2015 ― the first year with a consistent DOSM time-series. Eight years is long enough to see whether PAS administrations are closing the gap with the rest of Malaysia.

StatePAS in power*GDP pc 2015 (RM)GDP pc 2023 (RM)Nominal compound growth 2015-232023 level vs. national avg. (RM 54 612)
Kelantansince 199012 07516 836+4.2 % a year31 % of national
(en.wikipedia.org)
Terengganu1999-2004, 2018-now26 52931 111+2.0 % a year57 % of national
(en.wikipedia.org)
Kedah2008-13, 2020-now18 24926 353+4.7 % a year48 % of national
(en.wikipedia.org)
Perlissince 202220 19624 004+2.2 % a year44 % of national
(en.wikipedia.org)
Malaysia (average)37 10454 612+5.0 % a year100 %
(en.wikipedia.org)
Penang (for contrast)non-PAS44 84772 586+6.2 % a year133 %
(en.wikipedia.org)
Selangor (largest economy)non-PAS42 61162 492+4.9 % a year114 %
(en.wikipedia.org)

* PAS first entered Kedah in 2008, lost in 2013, and returned in 2020. Terengganu had a BN interlude 2004-18.


What the numbers mean – in plain language

  • Kelantan: grew by about 4 % a year, but Malaysia as a whole grew faster (5 %). That means Kelantan has slid from 32 % of the national average in 2015 to 31 % today. Put simply: it’s still the poorest state and is not catching up despite three decades of uninterrupted PAS rule.
  • Terengganu: even with billion-ringgit oil royalties, its income per person rose just 2 % a year – the slowest of any PAS state and far below the national pace. In 2015 an average Terengganu resident earned 71 % of the national mean; by 2023 that share is 57 %. The gap widened.
  • Kedah: the bright spot among PAS states. Thanks largely to the pre-existing Kulim High-Tech Park and Penang spill-overs, Kedah grew almost as fast as Malaysia. Yet its citizens still earn less than half the national average, so the distance hasn’t really narrowed.
  • Perlis: PAS only took office at end-2022, so its below-average trend (2 % growth) mostly reflects long-standing structural limits of a small, rural economy.
  • Penang & Selangor (benchmarks): These non-PAS states show what higher growth (5–6 % a year) looks like. Both started ahead and pulled further away – which is NOT what we would expect.

How about Poverty?

2022 Absolute-Poverty Rates by State

(Department of Statistics Malaysia – Household Income Survey)

State2022 poverty rate (% of households)*Notes
Sabah19.5 %Highest in the country
(sdg-for-malaysian-states-sdsn.hub.arcgis.com)
Kelantan 12.4 %Second-highest; long-run PAS administration
(sdg-for-malaysian-states-sdsn.hub.arcgis.com)
Terengganu 12.0 %Heavily oil-royalty dependent; PAS since 2018
(sesricdiag.blob.core.windows.net)
Sarawak9.0 %Large rural interior
(sdg-for-malaysian-states-sdsn.hub.arcgis.com)
Kedah 9.0 %PAS-led since 2020; figure crept up from 8.8 % (2019)
(en.wikipedia.org)
Perlis 8.9 %PAS only from late 2022; tiny agrarian state (DOSM dashboard)
(sesricdiag.blob.core.windows.net)
Perak7–8 %Mixed agriculture/industrial belt (DOSM dashboard)
Pahang~7 %Large rural east-coast interior (DOSM dashboard)
Johor3.9 %Diversified, manufacturing & services hub
(sesricdiag.blob.core.windows.net)
Melaka3.9 %Tourism–manufacturing mix
(sesricdiag.blob.core.windows.net)
Pulau Pinang3.9 %Electronics cluster, high urbanisation sesricdiag.blob.core.windows.net
Negeri Sembilan4.3 %Commuter belt to Klang Valley
(sesricdiag.blob.core.windows.net)
Selangor1.5 %Malaysia’s richest state
(aei.um.edu.my)
W.P. Kuala Lumpur1.4 %High-income, service economy
(aei.um.edu.my)
W.P. Labuan0.4 %Offshore finance hub
(aei.um.edu.my)
W.P. Putrajaya0.2 %Civil-service enclave, small population
(aei.um.edu.my)

Plain-English take-aways

  1. Poverty is clearly higher in PAS-governed states.
    • Kelantan and Terengganu are the only states on Peninsular Malaysia with double-digit poverty rates.
    • Kedah and Perlis also sit well above the national average despite far smaller populations.
  2. Royalty money isn’t a silver bullet.
    • Terengganu receives > RM1 billion in oil royalties most years, yet its poverty rate (12 %) is only slightly better than Kelantan’s (no royalties).
    • The quality of spending and economic diversification are stronger predictors of outcomes than the size of fiscal transfers.
  3. Urban, diversified states do best.
    • Selangor and Kuala Lumpur post poverty rates near 1 % thanks to broad-based job creation in manufacturing and services.
    • Penang, with an electronics export hub, keeps poverty under 4 % despite limited natural resources.
  4. East-Malaysia outlier.
    • Sabah’s 19.5 % underscores that geography and late infrastructure catch-up still matter; it is not a PAS state, showing that party control is only one factor.
  5. Trend since 2019:
    • Poverty nationwide rose sharply during COVID-19 (8.4 % in 2020) and eased to 6.2 % in 2022, but PAS states have been slower to recover, partly due to weaker tourism and outward migration of workers.

In short, PAS-run states consistently occupy the higher-poverty end of Malaysia’s spectrum, and while limited royalties (Kelantan) or boom-bust royalties (Terengganu) contribute, the persistent gap points to deeper issues of investment climate, industrial mix, and human-capital retention rather than fiscal transfers alone.


2 What PAS Inherited vs. What Changed

Kelantan

  • Starting point (1990): Poorest state, weak industrial base, poor road/water networks, but strong overseas remittances from migrant Kelantanese.
  • PAS record:
    • Limited capital spending—average development allocation < RM700 m/year vs > RM2 bn in most states.
    • Tight syariah-first bylaws (gender-segregated cinemas, alcohol curbs) seen by investors as red-tape; ISEAS notes “low private-sector dynamism” and out-migration of talent(iseas.edu.sg).
    • Oil royalty dispute: offshore deposits are beyond 3 n mi; Kelantan receives token goodwill money only (RM 58 m April 2025)(theedgemalaysia.com).
    • Outcome: GDP pc climbed, but only from 15 % to 31 % of national level; poverty remains > 20 %. Water losses (non-revenue water > 50 %) and roads top public-complaint list(theedgemalaysia.com).

Terengganu

  • Starting point (1999): An oil province with royalties > RM1 bn/yr; BN trophy projects (Crystal Mosque, Monsoon Cup) but limited diversification.
  • First PAS term (1999-2004): Federal government withheld royalties; growth stalled; PAS lost 2004.
  • Second PAS term (2018-present): Royalties restored—RM 1.05 bn in 2018, ~RM 1.27 bn in 2019(malaymail.com)(malaymail.com)
  • Structural flaw: 70 % of revenue from royalties; MARC Ratings flags “crowding-out” of tax effort and boom-bust budgets(marc.com.my). Non-oil GDP share stagnant.

Kedah

  • Starting point (2008): Paddy belt+Kulim High-Tech Park (Intel, OSRAM); poverty falling.
  • PAS 1st era (2008-2013): Focus on smallholder schemes & religious schools; disputes with Penang over water pricing dampened interstate cooperation; electronics cluster continued under MNCs.
  • PAS return (2020-): New agenda on rare-earth mining, solar parks; water dispute persists; SG4 bloc created with Dr Mahathir as adviser to lure FDI(straitstimes.com).
  • Scorecard: GDP pc rose but to only 57 % of national; poverty at 9 % (higher than 2009’s 5–6 %).

Perlis

  • PAS/PN only since 2022; too early for data shifts. Baseline: small agriculture, border trade with Thailand.

3 Systemic Differences in PAS Governance

FeatureHow PAS States DifferEconomic Consequence
Fiscal ModelHeavy reliance on federal transfers (Kelantan) or oil royalties (Terengganu); low own-source taxes.Volatile budgets, under-investment in infrastructure during downturns.
Regulatory ClimateMoral bylaws (liquor, entertainment segregation) stricter; local councils dominated by party cadres
(iseas.edu.sg)
.
Adds compliance costs; tourism & service SMEs complain of red-tape, deterring diversification.
Development PrioritiesHigher share of spending on religious schools, welfare stipends; lower on industrial parks, R&D.Slower tech & manufacturing catch-up vs. neighbour Penang; brain-drain of graduates.
Oil WindfallsTerengganu spends >60 % of royalty on operating outlays rather than long-term funds; Kelantan lacks such windfall but similar outcome.Classic “resource curse”: consumption today, limited savings for tomorrow.
Inter-governmental RelationsPeriodic royalty and grant disputes with federal govt.project delays (water, highways), investor uncertainty.

4 Did Anything Improve under PAS?

  • Human development: Literacy rates and basic amenities (electricity, piped water) improved nationwide, including PAS states. DOSM shows Kelantan’s rural electrification > 98 % by 2022 (from < 60 % in 1990).
  • Industrial enclaves: Terengganu’s downstream oil & gas cluster (Kertih) kept expanding; Kedah’s Kulim Park attracted higher-end chip back-end plants—both projects originated pre-PAS but were not derailed.
  • SG4 experiment (2024-): First proactive effort by PAS administrations to pool resources and seek FDI collectively; still untested but signals a shift from grievance politics to deal-making.

Is “Lack of Oil Royalties” the Whole Story?

No. Kelantan’s chronic poverty correlates with zero or low royalties, yet Terengganu shows that having > RM1 bn/year royalties doesn’t ensure prosperity; governance quality and diversification matter.

Oil cash is neither a silver bullet nor the root of all woes; it magnifies whatever institutional strengths or weaknesses already exist.


5 Bottom Line

  • PAS took over already-lagging states, but the gap with the national average has not closed; in relative terms Kelantan and Kedah remain stuck, Terengganu slid somewhat, and Perlis is unchanged.
  • Structural choices—fiscal dependence, moral-regulatory conservatism, modest investment in growth sectors—explain more of the under-performance than royalties alone.
  • The new SG4 bloc may indicate learning—but until PAS states address core issues (talent outflow, business climate, revenue diversity), oil checks or federal grants will continue to fund subsistence, not transformation.

Key Sources: DOSM state GDP & poverty datasets(en.wikipedia.org)(dosm.gov.my)(open.dosm.gov.my); CEIC state GDP series(ceicdata.com); oil-royalty payments reports(theedgemalaysia.com)(malaymail.com); ISEAS studies on PAS governance(iseas.edu.sg)(bookshop.iseas.edu.sg); Straits Times on SG4 formation(straitstimes.com); MARC Rating on Terengganu dependency(marc.com.my).

The Oil Royalty Question

Now perhaps Zaid or PAS politicians would like to talk about how in fact they have been deprived of royalties and don’t have the money and cannot develop.

Let’s now consider that aspect of the argument. In relation to what we can see from the moral policing that is characteristic of PAS states.

Why growth lags despite (or regardless of) oil money

  1. Oil royalties aren’t everything
    • Terengganu proves that having RM 1 billion-plus a year is no guarantee of faster growth; poor diversification and stop-go spending blunt the benefit.
  2. Investment climate matters
    • Kelantan’s restrictive by-laws (gender-segregated entertainment, liquor curbs) and limited infrastructure make investors choose Penang or Selangor instead.
  3. Fiscal model
    • Kelantan relies on federal grants; Terengganu on royalties. Both spend heavily on salaries and welfare, leaving less for productive capital projects that raise long-run incomes.
  4. Human-capital leakage
    • Young professionals from PAS states migrate to Klang Valley or Penang for better jobs, so local productivity growth stays low.

Take-away in one sentence

Over 2015-23 all PAS-run states grew in absolute terms, but—except for Kedah—they grew slower than Malaysia as a whole, so their people are not catching up in relative prosperity.

That shortfall stems more from policy and governance choices than from the presence or absence of oil royalties alone.

Wow, that was a long discussion. Give yourself a round of applause and sip some tea.

What can we see here?

We can see that even though PAS took over from other parties that were already lagging, they did not raise their states to new heights.

They are not doing so, there is no evidence that they are able to do so, and any potential indication that they will raise Malaysia to greater heights is wishful thinking and is likely ideological rather than on the basis of the existing data about PAS governance.

But wait, Mr. Zaid might say, “Past (PAS?) results do not guarantee the future!”

How wonderful. Therefore, we should not support your favourite party.

Maybe he will say:”Well, the statistics show that the Malay support PAS!”

How wonderful. Therefore, it is desirable for non-Malays to migrate unless there is deep evidence indicating that there will be a tectonic shift. That evidence is not present in your states and is at best based on a vain promise that is not supported by any earthly thing. We do not believe in your spiritual things, and based on your actions as identified above, it seems reasonable to conclude that many of you do not either.

Oh, but then…”You haven’t looked at what the people in Iran are doing! Clearly, they are deeply more capable!”

I’m glad that you asked!

Because this analysis includes also what our friends in Iran and in fact all Islamist parties around the world are doing.

With that in mind, here is a full-scale analysis of Iran which Mr Zaid seems to love so much, to establish a comparison between PAS and its existing failures that in turn do not tell a touching or inspiring tale about the economic future of this country if that governance were extended to the rest of Malaysia.

Introduction

Islamist political parties – those seeking to govern by Islamic principles – have had varied success in managing economic affairs. This report examines their economic governance across several countries (including Malaysia’s PAS) and then focuses on Iran.

We compare Iran’s economic progress before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in percentage growth terms, against world averages. We also consider the role of oil, private enterprise, and other factors in Iran’s economic trajectory. Finally, we analyze common trends in how Islamist-led regimes affect economic growth.

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